Air France 447 - On topic only!

[Gabriel]

I don't know what the argument is here.

Aw, come on, not again. The pilot was a pilot before AF. What the pilot did was so anti-pilotish that the lack of type specific UAS/stall/upset/high altitude manual flight training alone doesn't explain his reactions.

Despite not being in accordance with the procedures, the pilot actions (initial and sustained) were completely contrary to basic airmanship (and I mean BASIC).

I don't believe that fatigue can explain this either. An instant mistake, yes. Forgetting something, ok. Flipping the wrong swithc, maybe. Pulling up into a 7000 fpm climb for a lot of seconds until the plane stalls and then pull up again, no.

[3WE]

...the pilot actions (initial and sustained) were completely contrary to basic airmanship (and I mean BASIC)...

Wrong

There is no such thing as basic airmanship.

There is only the POH and it's checklists...

...and the FARs.

...and black

...and white.

Why are you such a total idiot and unable to get that through your thick head?

[Evan]

Aw, come on, not again. The pilot was a pilot before AF. What the pilot did was so anti-pilotish that the lack of type specific UAS/stall/upset/high altitude manual flight training alone doesn't explain his reactions.

So, Gabriel, which do you believe?

a) The pilot did not understand basic airmanship, despite being trained in basic airmanship, earning a professional pilots license and flying for one of the world's most respected airlines.

-or-

b) The pilot, in a startled state of awareness in total darkness had a degraded sense of situational awareness, improper judgment and flawed motor skill reactions.

If your answer is (a), then all hope is lost. This is the bravado answer.

If you answer is (b), then we must recognize the human factors involved and adhere to trained memory procedures that must become instinctive under such circumstances and are not subject to the pilot's interpretation of 'basic airmanship' in that moment of confused awareness. "Do these simple things to stabilize the aircraft, then take a moment to ascertain the situation and work the problem through proper CRM". Yes, most pilots will use their basic airmanship to get through the situation intact, but not all. Sooner or later this was going to happen. The only defense against human factors were the memory items.

The reason these pilots (or any other pilots) did not perform the memory items and CRM is because they were not being trained on them. They were and are essential to preventing this kind of accident.

Thus far, I 100% agree with the findings of the BEA, except that they have yet to find themselves ultimately at fault.

[Gabriel]

So, Gabriel, which do you believe?

a) The pilot did not understand basic airmanship, despite being trained in basic airmanship, earning a professional pilots license and flying for one of the world's most respected airlines.

-or-

b) The pilot, in a startled state of awareness in total darkness had a degraded sense of situational awareness, improper judgment and flawed motor skill reactions.

Yes, in that order. You might add basic Airbus' FBW airmanship (just in case he pulled up and kept pulling up for lack of understanding of the alternate law, which we don't know if it was the case).

... we must recognize the human factors involved and adhere to trained memory procedures ...

Again, I'm all for it. I've said that that ALONE is not enough to explain it. Not that it's not a key cause in the chain. It is.
Again, please, by all means, train PILOTS for UAS/upset/stall etc. But you need raw material first.
Again, if I was be forced into a plane that WILL have an UAS event, but I'm given the choice between ITS with no UAS training and a puppy-mill pilot with UAS training and poor airmanship, I take ITS every day and night. ITS + UAS training would be better and we must go for it.

[Evan]

ITS + UAS training would be better and we must go for it.

This is precisely what must be required of commercial pilots, and repeated training and proficiency must be required to remain a commercial pilot. Right now, this VERY obviously isn't the case, and yet there are legions of idiots out there blaming the aircraft instead of the regulators. That's my point. That's all I'm saying.

[Highkeas]

............. I don't want people eliminated from cockpits, and in fact I don't think they will be eliminated any time soon exactly because of incidents like this.
.................................

At least one major aircraft manufacturer has plans for unpiloted passenger aircraft. Way back people refused to use an elevator unless it had an operator and more recently refused to ride trains without drivers (BART was one as I recall). Time frame is probably towards end of this century is my guess.
Sorry to divert from the AF447 thread.

[Deadstick]

Bullcrap!

Give the flight crew fish poisoning and put Gabriel and Deadstick in the back of the plane and get the hostie to call them up to the cockpit to "work the radios".

I have a beer that says that Gabriel will say, "I have formal training in aeronautical engineering and you have a glider rating, You fly, I'll work the systems."

...and even IF Deadstick says, but you talk too much, YOU fly, I'll work the radios...

...they will STILL work out a healthy CRM relationship...

...and, I even bet there is never a stall warning as they maintain a decent airspeed by using a good attitude and power setting...

I hope Gabriel doesn't mind steep bank angles, cause I'm going to pull the power and thermal that sucker.

[Gabriel]

I hope Gabriel doesn't mind steep bank angles, cause I'm going to pull the power and thermal that sucker.

I don't mind bank angles, but be careful: These lads are certified for up to 2.5Gs only.

[3WE]

... if I was be forced into a plane that WILL have an UAS event, but I'm given the choice between ITS with no UAS training and a puppy-mill pilot with UAS training and poor airmanship, I take ITS every day and night. ITS + UAS training would be better and we must go for it.

Who is this ITS, that would fly a plane based solely on fundamental airmanship and what is a puppy mill pilot?

[Evan]

From the Qantas 72 final report:

The FDR also showed that, during the period between the initial autopilot 1 disconnection and when autopilot 2 was engaged, the aircraft’s altitude increased to 37,180 ft.

This slight increase in altitude was associated with small pitch-up inputs from the captain’s sidestick.

Why? Is there something inherent in the training that produces a tendency to make pitch up inputs when taking manual control after A/P failure in level flight? Is this due to a psychological issue?

Yes Gabriel, I realize this does not explain a protracted pitch increase leading to stall, but it is the first destabilizing input in the sequence.

[3WE]

...there is no CRM training for a crew made up of two copilots in a situation with a relief Captain...

...put Gabriel and Deadstick in the...plane and...they will...work out a healthy CRM relationship...

I hope Gabriel doesn't mind steep bank angles, cause I'm going to pull the power and thermal that sucker.

I don't mind bank angles, but be careful: These lads are certified for up to 2.5Gs only.

Amazing, CRM, demonstrated right here and no formal CRM training.

Score another one for fundamental thinkers!

(The two bolded words say a lot- Know the fundamentals and think!)

[Fear_of_Flying]

Amazing, CRM, demonstrated right here and no formal CRM training.

Score another one for fundamental thinkers!

(The two bolded words say a lot- Know the fundamentals and think!)

If only the answers were so simple. I'm sure the AF pilots thought they knew what they were doing, and if they participated on this forum, we all would have thought 'I'd have no worries flying with these guys.' There is a difference between the CRM demonstrated "right here" and the CRM required in the real world. I think the fact that no one could actually tell that one of the pilots was pulling up the whole time is itself an issue. This puts too high an expectation on the verbal communication that is needed under pressure, and hopefully is one of the lessons that Airbus can take out of this accident.

[Evan]

There is a difference between the CRM demonstrated "right here" and the CRM required in the real world.

If I have this right, the CRM (aka task assignment) "demonstrated" is that the PF flies the plane and monitors the flight instruments while the PM monitors the ECAM, the instruments related to the situation and reads through the QRH checklists to inform the PF. Explain to me how the "real world CRM" should be different from that.

I think the fact that no one could actually tell that one of the pilots was pulling up the whole time is itself an issue. This puts too high an expectation on the verbal communication that is needed under pressure, and hopefully is one of the lessons that Airbus can take out of this accident.

It is impossible to put too high of an expectation on verbal communication at a time like that. Verbal communication is absolutely necessary because tasks must be divided so that the PF can concentrate on the primary task of flying the plane. The PM needs to tell him things like "flight directors off" and "move thrust levers". He needs to tell him "5° pitch and CLB power". He should never have to tell him things like "level off before you stall". The stall warning is already telling him this anyway.

One of the lessons that Airbus can take out of this accident is the following:

 the copilots had not received any training, at high altitude, in the “Unreliable IAS” procedure and manual aircraft handling

So perhaps more automated protection is necessary.

[BoeingBobby]

If only the answers were so simple. I'm sure the AF pilots thought they knew what they were doing, and if they participated on this forum, we all would have thought 'I'd have no worries flying with these guys.' There is a difference between the CRM demonstrated "right here" and the CRM required in the real world. I think the fact that no one could actually tell that one of the pilots was pulling up the whole time is itself an issue. This puts too high an expectation on the verbal communication that is needed under pressure, and hopefully is one of the lessons that Airbus can take out of this accident.

Have you ever heard the call "I have the aircraft"? or "It's my airplane"?
Or ANYTHING close to those words?

I cannot believe that you all are still bantering this back and forth after the release of the CVR tapes. They f****d up that is all there is to it!

[Evan]

They f****d up that is all there is to it!

Yes. But why? And what is to be done about it?