Southwest Airlines Nose Gear Collapse at LGA

[snydersnapshots]

Again, sadly, I believe that Joe's opinion and reaction is all too indicative of many others that perceive aviation and its workforce in a relatively uninformed light. I think it is therefore useful to have that view on a discussion forum simply to understand that a view that is peculiar to those within the industry. For every Joe H, there are probably hundreds like minded readers that do not air their views. I also believe that Joe's views are often the result of tabloid type journalism and sensationalist programs that 'teach' the masses how they should react: judgment, outrage and revenge rather than balanced justice.

As abhorrent as some of the views and the manner in which they are expressed may sometimes be, I for one am fascinated by them, though not as much as the invaluable views of the experienced and educated... so as long as the attitude can be moderated but since this is the burden of moderators, the ultimate decision of course is Brian's.

VERY well said.

[brianw999]

At the moment he's reasonably safe. A lot of his past posts have a reasonably sensible, if slightly childlike presentation so I'll recommend he stay for a while to entertain us, but if the inflammatory attacks continue then he'll be gone.

[3WE]

I'm confused. What does turbine inlet temperature have to do with botched landings?

[Gabriel]

It seems you NOW agree that it is NOT the SAME as driving your car at 3 MPH ? - or am I mistaking what you say ?.

The person flying for 34 years for a profession, said that the 'pilot' was involved in :
"landing on the nosewheel, wrecking the airplane, and injuring passengers".

What more do you want ? - that is a simple fender bender ? - a 'simple' mistake ?
Possibly Tired ? - a long day ?

WHAT is the difference here in Asiana's and Southwest's 'mistakes' ?

I'm not sure why, but I'll make the attempt.

Ok Joe. Tell me. What was the mistake that this pilot made?

Don't tell me that they "landed nose first, they wrecked and airplane, they injured people". I don't accept that.

Those are not mistakes. Those are outcomes.

Let me explain the action model:

Pilots have a background (knowledge, skills).
Pilots gather information (from the ATC, the instruments, the airplane feedback...)
Pilots make judgments (this is good, this is bad, these are the risks).
Pilots take decisions (so, we'll do this).
Pilots take actions to attempt to realize their decisions (push buttons, move levers, say things).
Then, we have an outcome.

Take Asiana: First they were too high, too fast and in a too steep approach. Shortly before the crash they were too slow, too low and in a too shallow path. Finally they crashed short of the runway. A plane was written off, 8 people died, and hundred resulted injured, some possibly with permanent disabilities.

As horrible as it sounds, nothing of that is a mistake.

Now, these pilots failed to establish a stabilized approach, decided not to go around when they reached the stabilized approach gate in a non-stabilized condition, failed to monitor the airspeed and the operation of the autothrottle. Those are mistakes. And even if they had managed to obtain the best and smoothest landing ever made, that good outcome doesn't change a bit the mistakes that they did and the severity of them.

I criticize those pilots for those mistakes, one of which, to make it worse, was intentional.

So, again, What is what these SW pilots did so wrong to deserve the level of verbal violence from you? The answer, I fear, is you don't know.

That doesn't mean that they didn't do some serious and perhaps unforgivable mistakes. Just that we don't know yet.

[Evan]

I criticize those pilots for those mistakes, one of which, to make it worse, was intentional.

AFAIK, mistakes are never intentional. I'm accepting of human error and the mistakes that will inevitably be made in commercial aviation. I have no tolerance however for the intentional disrespect and violation of rules that exist specifically to compensate for this inevitable human error. If pilots are given ANY latitude to break those rules, then it's just a matter of time...

We don't know yet what happened with this Southwest flight, which is why we are not coming down on the pilots. We do know what happened on the Asiana flight (even if we don't know why yet). Those pilots intentionally continued a clearly unstable approach down to and below MDA and THAT condemns them in my opinion.

[Gabriel]

I fully agree.

However, sometimes person make a decision that they know it's not "legal" and later honestly regret having done so. In that regard, it could be considered a mistake (the act itself was not a mistake, but making the wrong decision was), which doesn't mean that it's acceptable.

By the way, have you ever gone 10 MPH above the speed limit? (in your car, I mean).

[Evan]

I fully agree.

However, sometimes person make a decision that they know it's not "legal" and later honestly regret having done so. In that regard, it could be considered a mistake (the act itself was not a mistake, but making the wrong decision was), which doesn't mean that it's acceptable.

But this is the important distinction: pilots do not need to make a decision with these rules in place: the decision has been made in advance: that's the whole idea behind them. Here's a stabilization gate: are you outside the allowable range? Yes: go around, try again. No decision necessary, just recognition. Everybody lives.

Take V1 for example. You calculate everything in advance, enter your reference speed, your decision is now made. There is no danger of making the wrong decision later when you are confused and under stress. Engine out before V1: pull the thrust. Engine out after V1: you go. (barring complicating circumstances like being on fire, etc.).

MDA is another example. You can't see the runway at MDA, no decision, just recognition: go around, try again.

Airbus clearly specifies stabilization criteria. I'm sure Boeing does as well. It allows for some latitude. Beyond that there is no decision process: go around, try again. (barring complicating circumstances like being on fire etc.). It has to work this way or it is just a matter of time...

And this has been tragically proven time and time again.

Gabriel, I know I'm preaching your gospel here. I just think we need to discriminate between human error and intentional recklessness.

By the way, have you ever gone 10 MPH above the speed limit? (in your car, I mean).

In the US we used to have a 55mph speed limit on straight open stretches of 5-lane freeway. No one could drive this slow. Everyone drove at least 60-65mph. If you drove 55mph, you were putting yourself and others in danger. The safe thing was to drive with traffic. After giving out tickets for many years to drivers who were actually doing the right thing from a safety point-of-view (which is all that matters) the goverment finally raised the speed limits. What I'm trying to say here is: flawed analogy.

[snydersnapshots]

But this is the important distinction: pilots do not need to make a decision with these rules in place: the decision has been made in advance: that's the whole idea behind them. Here's a stabilization gate: are you outside the allowable range? Yes: go around, try again. No decision necessary, just recognition. Everybody lives.

Unfortunately, what leads pilots "down the path" is what I call an "incremental violation of the rules." With a visual approach as an example. Say the gate is set at 1,000 feet. Say you're a few knots fast when you hit 1,000, but you know you can be on speed by 850, so instead of hitting the TOGA buttons at 1,000 like you're supposed to, you continue the approach. You're on speed at 850' and all works out well. Besides...the powers that be recently changed the gate from 500' to 1,000 feet, so I know I can do it.

The pilot violates the rules and doesn't get bitten, so the next time a similar situation arises it's that much easier to do the same thing. Only maybe this time you're faster than last time and a little high on the glide path too.

Now, throw in management's attitude which perhaps says "the book says you have to go around, but if you don't, we're not going to penalize you for it..."

I'm not saying this is what happened in the SWA accident, but I'm giving some examples of how a pilot can be lead down the path...

[Gabriel]

Evan,
Again, I fully agree.
What I meant is that reality is typically a bit more complex.
Things are hardly fully black or white, there are shades of gray in the middle.
There are external issues, mitigating factors, contributing factors, systemic issues, contexts...
I mean, a pilot would hardly suddenly wake up one day and say "today I'll violate the stabilized approach criteria" out of nowhere.

[3WE]

In the US we used to have a 55mph speed limit on straight open stretches of 5-lane freeway. No one could drive this slow. Everyone drove at least 60-65mph. If you drove 55mph, you were putting yourself and others in danger. The safe thing was to drive with traffic. After giving out tickets for many years to drivers who were actually doing the right thing from a safety point-of-view (which is all that matters) the goverment finally raised the speed limits. What I'm trying to say here is: flawed analogy.

Two things. 1) There's those absolute terms again. Lots of people drove 55, hell some folks STILL DO. Lots of folks drove 55 because they did not want to get tickets, lots of folks drove 55 because there was a speed zone, lots of folks drove 55 to improve fuel mileage and lots of folks drove 55 because it was the law.

2) Now, for the real flaw Evan: Highway death tolls dropped markedly.

So, if you think about it, your total intolerance for aviation rules which are there to cover for human mistakes and generate safety margins? The 55 MPH speed limit did exactly that. Driving 70 MPH is significantly more dangerous with a body count thousands of percent bigger than Asiana and infinity % bigger than Southwest airlines...

hmmm......

PS- you mention a need to go with the flow of traffic- while there is truth there, the fact remains that everone going faster is creating a higher risk and violating those safety margins for which you have no tolerance.

[Evan]

Evan,
Again, I fully agree.
What I meant is that reality is typically a bit more complex.
Things are hardly fully black or white, there are shades of gray in the middle.
There are external issues, mitigating factors, contributing factors, systemic issues, contexts...
I mean, a pilot would hardly suddenly wake up one day and say "today I'll violate the stabilized approach criteria" out of nowhere.

And again, I fully agree.
I posted somewhere weeks ago about how risk provides the greatest reward and reward is the strongest form of education. So we tend to learn to take risks and the more we get away with it the less we see it as risk (see global finanacial meltdown).

This is exactly why certain criteria has to be black and white and enforced. Risk requires opportunity. As long as the decision process is not there—because these are hardfast rules—you remove the opportunity to take risks (unless the pilot rejects the culture itself and that is a whole other topic of discussion).

Back when MCM was with us, we had that thread about black and white thinking (in the shadow of AF447). He agreed with me that there is a time for black and white thinking and a time for grey area, creative problem solving and a qualified pilot must know when to apply each.

Absolutes like MDA, V1 and stabilization gates exist so that there is no confusion: this is where you apply black and white thinking.

That said, within the stabilization criteria there is an allowance for being slightly off your targets, so it allows for deviations that a pilot can expect to overcome by the next gate. So within the white area there is still some grey area. But the black area is always black. It has to be.

Also very important and I think underemphasized in training: black and white criteria is there to preserve margin for error. Once outside the criteria, the pilot may still be able to save the approach in most cases, but he has lost that vital contingency for error. So it works out fine on 99.99% of approaches and then one day another factor(s) creeps into the equation, like the A/T mode trips you up, and you have no margin left: it's game over.

So, yes, the vital issue is the creeping risk/reward cycle that pulls people into violating rules that are there to protect them (and their cargo) by rewarding risk-taking with success. However, maybe I'm naive but I don't think a truly intelligent, well-trained pilot is susceptible to this tendency because he/she will never forget the gravity of the mission and the quasi-religious sanctity of those rules. In other words, as a professional he/she will never intentionally violate these B&W rules. I think this is why incidents like this are so rare. But I also believe the problem is more widespread than we recognize and that weakly-trained, rule-breaking pilots are landing safely quite often and learning this reward-based lesson in risk taking.

So... we must greatly instill the sanctity of stabilization criteria into pilot training (and retraining), impose stiff punishment on violators (including management if they are encouraging this) and keep the weeds out of the cockpit in the first place.

[Evan]

Two things. 1)
2) Now, for the real flaw Evan: Highway death tolls dropped markedly.

3WE, I can't say this to you often enough: facts are not something you invent.

In 1995 the Republican Congress repealed the 55-mile-per-hour federal speed limit law. Despite the fact that 33 states raised their speed limits immediately after the repeal of the mandatory federal speed limit, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration reported last October that “the traffic death rate dropped to a record low level in 1997.” Moreover, the average fatality rate even fell in the states that raised their speed limits. Higher speed limits have not caused one million more auto injuries. In fact, in 1997 there were 66,000 fewer road injuries than in 1995, the year before the speed limits were raised

http://www.cato.org/publications/pol...ph-speed-limit

But enough... it is not a viable analogy!

[3WE]

3WE, I can't say this to you often enough: facts are not something you invent.

http://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/speed-doesnt-kill-repeal-55mph-speed-limit

But enough... it is not a viable analogy!

Nope- you are still wrong....

This is a clear case of cherry picking data....

When the 55 MPH speed limit was enacted, deaths dropped...Markedly.

Plain and simple- when you crashed, it was less severe.

Then you go and pick data that repsresents 1970-something cars with no air bags, likely no shoulder strap, possibly no collapsible steering column and a culture where seat belts were rampantly not worn....

Then you go and pick data where cars have DO have all the safety features and crumple zones and highway guard rail improvements....

Good fair comparrison....NOT!

I don't have the time, but the data are out there and are big as day despite what you wish to belive in your fairy-tale world.

How about I say that zillions of planes land every day without bumping their tail on the runway threshold or smashing their nose wheel...there's some solid data that says that there is really no point whatsoever in having this OR the Asiana thread....That's the facts and you can't dismiss Gabriel's nor my Analogy in your nice and clean, black and white world.

[3WE]

Wikipedia is Cool, and should be available on the flight deck./blue font

55 MPH Speed limit enacted in 1974: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Maximum_Speed_Law

Highway deaths drop 17%

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_motor_vehicle_deaths_in_U.S._by_year

Hmmmm.......

And....

25,507 - 21,134 = 4,373

Indeed we have a serious problem with pilots botching landings.

Footnote: I'm sure Evan will find this sentence: "The limit's effect on highway safety is unclear".

My reply to that is to read on to the long list of studies- some which suggest a benefit, some which suggest no benefit...

The bottom lines are: 1) Cherry picking (or slicing) data can give you a variety of results. 2) The effect of generally reducing crash velocity and a 17% reduction in deaths... Do I dare parlour talk that 55 might be safer?

...and that Gabriel's analogy is valid?

[Evan]

Cherry picking (or slicing) data can give you a variety of results.

So stop doing it.

The non-cherrypicked FACT is that when the 55mph limit was repealed, traffic fatalies did not go up, they went down, down to record low levels. You can thank the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration for those FACTS.

It is also requires only simple logic to realize that if all the cars on a stretch of freeway are moving at relatively the same speed of 65mph, it is a safer situation than if some cars are moving 65 and some are moving 55. Most multiple car traffic accidents occur when cars overtake or pass each other. How many times did we see grandma tooling along at 55 while everyone else is busting some risky, desperate move to get around her?

Yes, safety improvements in automotive design are also largely influencing those numbers. I didn't say they weren't. I simply said that the national 55mph speed limit was not actually safer than setting higher limits based upon the conditions of the road and the flow of traffic. And I gave you the facts to back that up.

I also said all of this simply to point out that the analogy is flawed and has no relevance to the thread. But you keep missing that point...