Landing into a storm

[flight191]

191- It seems you are a little fixated on 1) the lack of information being conveyed and 2) the radar tilt thing. 3) some other screwball aviation forum besides this one.

I'm thinking the answer to Bobby should be more like, "ok, perhaps that radar tilt comment is wrong"

Indeed, there's a rule that pilots should be aware of all information pertinent to the flight and there are a few things that could possibly have been fed to 191 that were not.

But have you read up on the Southern airways flameout- that happened at cruise, no less -and involved some "unconveyed weather"?

1) Yes, absolutely, agree with Kapustin on it, they had little to no info
2) Again, NOT MY STATEMENT, I quoted Dave Gwinn. It is BB who keeps harping and browbeating on the tilt INCESSANTLY AND AD NAUSEUM! (read the previous posts, specifically post #92)
3) Not fixated on any particular forum, I just wanted everyone to be aware that the NTSB report is INCOMPLETE and not a full account of the events. As a matter of historical record, its flawed and should have at least an addendum with Kapustin's observations/rebuttals. I only was responding to your initial posting about the storm info which started the whole tangent to begin with. And, I added Dave Gwinn's quote to rebut your assertion in post #78 that no planes had encountered weather (which both the Lear and AA351 had)

And one final observation from Jerome Greer Chandler:

"We'll never know what went on in the man's mind, but, without too much conjecture we can conclude that it is likely he did what any good pilot would. He weighed the evidence: others, in front of him, had gone through the shower with no apparent problems; there were no reports of thunderstorms from the ground; Gene Skipworth (the controller) had just cleared him to land. One ninety-one flew on."

I have to re-review the Southern Airways incident but I think I was vaguely aware of that.

[BoeingBobby]

They were never pointed AT that storm until final approach. IT was camouflaged by a dissapating storm in front of it. They were at LOW LEVEL and had no tilt capabilities to see what awaited them.

This is from your post, there are no quotation marks so it looked as though you were making the statement. Again, I have read all of the links that you have posted, and watched the videos. NO WHERE in any of it did I see or hear anything about the inability to tilt the radar.

[flight191]

This is from your post, there are no quotation marks so it looked as though you were making the statement. Again, I have read all of the links that you have posted, and watched the videos. NO WHERE in any of it did I see or hear anything about the inability to tilt the radar.

WHAT EXACTLY ARE THESE?!?!?!?!?!?!

"Incidentally, in the Delta 191 accident, Archie's analysis is badly flawed. They were never pointed AT that storm until final approach. IT was camouflaged by a dissapating storm in front of it. They were at LOW LEVEL and had no tilt capabilities to see what awaited them. AA#351 was asked if they could see the airport and replied: "When we get out of THIS RAINSHOWER we will." That was the last report Capt Connors heard. A big deal was made of the lighning strike. That was a FLASH 1.5 miles to the east of the approach course. The tower controllers saw NINE STRIKES ON THE SOUTH side of that storm and told no one. Capt Toler in Piedmont 70 stopped his plane so his crew could see: "I've seen squall lines before, but this was a monster. I wanted my crew to see it and couldn't believe they were landing planes through it." His wind shear began at 800' AGL. All wind shear training prior to that was Dr. John McCarthy, and his $499 training tape ENDED with "Remember, fellows, you HAVE to be BELOW 500'." He has immediately then amended UAL's FOP manual to state that wind shear can be entrapment at 1,000' and below.
Capt Connors had refused a South arrival, because "we're not tangling with thunderstorms" and was given a holding pattern at SHV for 23 minutes. On the Blue Ridge arrival with vectors, he was never pointed at that storm until he was committed to the approach. He had a 31 yr flawless career, nine type ratings, and a line checkman on 3 heavies. His F/O and F/E were training center instructors."

I've had enough of your browbeating. I'm getting off your passive-aggressive holier than thou merry go round.

[brianw999]

Right ........ Enough is enough.

Everyone here needs to take a chill pill and cease these pointless "I can piss higher than you 'cos mine's bigger than yours" attitudes. Get it back on track and stick to the topic.

Two things to remember though here....

God created thunderstorms possibly to piss pilots off but what's the difference between God and a pilot ?

God doesn't think he's a pilot !

...and what's the difference between God and a non-pilot ?

Non pilots generally don't think they are God !

Now......let's get back to a structured discussion and drop all the accusations and bitching.

[BoeingBobby]

It was not meant to be a "brow beating". I am pointing out a flaw in what I believed to be a statement made by you. My point is, that whomever made this statement, it is wrong. The aircraft had the ability to tilt the dish up during the decent and look ahead at what was there waiting for them. The level of attenuation on that short a range would be negligible so they would have been able to see the other cell through the lighter shower in front.

And Brian, As someone who does this for a living 17 days every month. It bothers me when people spout off things that they really know nothing about. Then they post it here and elsewhere as though it was a fact. I believe I have stayed on topic throughout the whole thread. And unless you or he are flying an A-380 or an AN-124/AN-225, Mine is bigger! LOL

[MCM]

Mine might be a little smaller, but its much more fun for everyone involved

Sportscar vs Bus :P

[BoeingBobby]

Mine might be a little smaller, but its much more fun for everyone involved

Sportscar vs Bus :P

And you also don't go away for as long as I have to!

[Gabriel]

MCM, BoeingBobby,
Since you are around, would you mind answering my question a few slots above? I am really curious about that, and I think you are the only ones around here who can address this. VNav, you too. But I haven't seen you around for a few weeks.

Let me quote it here again for convenience:

So, I understand that there is a policy not to land with a thunderstorm close to the field. but this policy is maybe not so strictly and evenly applied.

So a question for MCM, BoeingBobby [and Vnav]:

What's exactly the poilicy, and what data do you use to comply with it?
The second part of the question aims at, how do you know if there is a thunderstorm close to the field? Or how you distinguish the weather condition where the landing is prohibited by this policy from other similarly looking weather?

MCM mentioned that a red return means lots of rain, but not necessarily stormy wind conditions or heavy turbulence. That would be the case with the rainstorms typical of tropical regions (like Miami). And that this weather is neither dangerous nor under the scope of the "no landing" policy. So you get a red return, you see a very dark cloud and a rainshower ahead. Maybe even a lighting here or there. How do you know if you are ok to land?

[BoeingBobby]

Gabriel, This is right out of our FOM: Hope this helps.


Thunderstorm Avoidance

Takeoff and Landing

When significant thunderstorm activity is approaching within 15 miles of the airport, consider the best options using all available information for this judgment including: PIREP, ground radar, airplane radar, tower reported winds, and visual observations. Gust fronts in advance of a thunderstorm frequently contain high winds, and strong vertical and horizontal wind shears, capable of causing an upset near the ground. A gust front can affect a departure corridor or runway without affecting other areas of the airport. Under such conditions, tower reported winds and the altimeter setting could be misleading. Microbursts may also accompany thunderstorms. Microbursts are violent, short-lived descending columns of air, two miles or less in diameter, capable of producing horizontal winds sometimes exceeding 60 knots within 150 feet of the ground. Microbursts commonly last one to five minutes, and may emanate from high-based cumulus clouds accompanied by little or no precipitation, or may be associated with large cumulonimbus buildups and be accompanied by heavy rainfall. Because they are relatively small in diameter, airport anemometers and low level wind shear alert systems (LLWSAS) may not sense this phenomenon in time to provide an adequate warning of nearby microburst activity.

Lateral Avoidance

At altitudes above the freezing level, supercooled rain and hail may be indicated as only weak radar echoes, which can mask extreme thunderstorm intensity. Avoid weak echoes associated with thunderstorms by the following minimum distances:

• FL 200 by 5 miles
• FL 250 by 10 miles
• FL300 and above by 20 miles

Overflight

Avoid overflying thunderstorms, unless a minimum of 5,000 feet clearance above the storm top is ensured. When possible, detour between the storm cells of a squall line rather than directly above them. The recommended lateral separation from intense cells is 10 miles. Keep the radar antenna tilted down during overflight to properly assess the most severe cells that may be masked by cloud formations.

Flight Near Thunderstorms

If flight closer than the minimum recommended distances is unavoidable, observe the following precautions:

• When necessary to parallel lines of cells, the safest path is on the upwind side (the side away from the direction of storm travel). Although severe turbulence and hail can be encountered in any direction outside a thunderstorm, strong drafts and hail are more often encountered outside the body of the cell on the downwind side.
• Avoid flight under the anvil. The greatest possibility of encountering hail is downwind of the cell, where hail falls from the anvil or is tossed out from the side of the storm. Hail has been encountered as much as 20 miles downwind from large thunderstorms.
• Avoid cirrus and cirrostratus layers downwind from the storm tops. Such layers may be formed by cumulonimbus tops and may contain hail, even though the radarscope shows little or no return echoes.
• If ATC requirements make flight into unsafe conditions imminent, the Captain will request a change of routing and if necessary use emergency authority to avoid the severe weather conditions.

Thunderstorm Penetration

If thunderstorm penetration is unavoidable, the following guidelines will reduce the possibility of entering the worst areas of turbulence and hail:

• Use the radar to determine the areas of least precipitation. Select a course affording a relatively straight path through the storm. Echoes appearing hooked, finger-like, or scalloped indicate areas of extreme turbulence, hail, and possibly tornadoes. These areas must be avoided.
• Penetrate perpendicular to the thunderstorm line. Once inside the cell, continue ahead. The likelihood of an upset is greatly increased when a turn is attempted in severe turbulence.
• Expect very large excursions in the pitot static instruments. Pressure changes of 10 inches (equaling 10,000 feet) may be encountered in strong drafts. Gyro-stabilized instruments supply the only accurate flight instrument indications under such conditions.
• Avoid areas where the vertical wind shear is forecast to exceed or exceeds 6 kts per 1,000 feet.
• The most severe turbulence is found in the vicinity near low pressure centers where the winds make sharp directional changes regardless of velocity, and in the sharp wind shift areas associated with pressure troughs, and occasionally in ridges. The sharpness of the wind shift determines the degree of turbulence.

[ATLcrew]

And Brian, As someone who does this for a living 17 days every month. It bothers me when people spout off things that they really know nothing about.

Welcome to the internet. The lounge is on your left.

[BoeingBobby]

Welcome to the internet. The lounge is on your left.

Just wondering, is smoking allowed in the lounge?

[3WE]

...As someone who does this for a living 17 days every month. It bothers me when people spout off things that they really know nothing about....

...And unless you or he are flying an A-380 or an AN-124/AN-225, Mine is bigger! LOL

You STILL never addressed the question of how AA 1420 could make a landing with a severe thunderstorm occuring on the field when the policy- in really big bold font- is that you don't land in convective weather.

As you have seen, pilots do not always follow policy! Oh no there goes that humans f up from time to time thing again!!

What usually happens when one guy f's up is, the rest of us get f'd. New policy since the LCF wrong airport landing just handed down. The landing airport will now always be put into the fix page. The 500' call has now been modified to include the landing runway number as well as "checked" by the PF, and the repeat of the runway number by the PM.

Big bold #1- no personal flaming intents here, I actually think this thread is good, and it probably gets a bit out of control because this is not a black and white issue (nor is it a red and green radar return issue).

I hate to say it- but I think the parlour talking ass hats have some knowledge that landing in storms is a judgement call that isn't always made at the level of Boing Bobby's conservatism. And I'm not sure that we need to shut up and go away with that assertion just because we aren't ATPs.

A lot of folks are making statements that contain a lot of truth- but maybe not 100% truth- so bring on the arguments.

Did Delta 191 plow wrecklessly and wantonly into a storm that most other 'idiots' would have avoided? I don't think so- the guy ahead did and the guy behind was right there a few miles behind 191...yeah, he was talking about the storm but he didn't ask to break off the approach.

What about AA 1420? You mean that two guys agreed to land in that and there's not some sort of clear policy restricting that sort of landing to 'only in a dire emergency'? (Yeah, sorry Bobby, the regulation and ops department needed to add some verbiage to the flight manual since your friend's judgement was off).

I'm definately an outsider who only knows 'half the story' (and posting it here on an obscure forum), but I'm really looking forward to a good, stable, long-lived, severe squall line this summer, I'm going out to the airport with my wrist watch, paper and pencil and recording the times of landings, leading-edge gusts, rain-onset and resumption of operations. I'll also take the camera for some nasty cloud pics, and my smart phone with RADAR and FlightAware dialed up for some time-and-resolution-tainted supplimental data!

[brianw999]

As a non pilot airline passenger here's my take on the situation.

You are flying me somewhere. You land in storm. You hurt me or even worse, kill me and I or my family will sue the arse off you and/or your company.

Fair enough ?

[Gabriel]

Pilot behavior regarding thunderstorms

Experts from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) created a study recording behavior of pilots landing at Dallas/Fort Worth Airport; the researchers checked to see whether pilots land in thunderstorms. Within a total of two thousand thunderstorm encounters, two out of three pilots landed in a thunderstorm. The study states that pilots exhibited more recklessness when they fell behind schedule, if they landed during the night, and if aircraft in front of them also landed in bad weather. Greg Feith, the lead NTSB investigator, said he felt surprised that pilots exhibited this behavior. The MIT study illustrated the industry-wide trends that factored into the Flight 1420 crash. Feith added that the pilots may have exhibited "get there-itis" as the pilots knew that they were approaching their 14 hour duty limits.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/American_Airlines_Flight_1420#Pilot_behavior_regarding_thunderstorms

[ATLcrew]

Just wondering, is smoking allowed in the lounge?

We have a separate smoking lounge out back, behind the heavy maintenance hangar. You'll know it by the smell.